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Dodd-Frank Derivatives Regulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffett made the prescient observation in the 2002
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report that "derivatives are financial
weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent,
are potentially lethal."' While this comparison between over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives and weapons of mass destruction was cer-
tainly prophetic in terms of the massive losses caused by derivatives
trading in the 2008 financial crisis, 2 the analogy also applies from a reg-
ulatory standpoint. Like their government cohorts at the State Depart-
ment who have recognized the essential need for global cooperation in
the fight against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 3 the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission are now faced with the similar challenge of harmonizing
regulatory standards with other jurisdictions to give proper effect to the
recent overhaul of OTC derivatives markets regulation.4
Following the implosion of global financial markets and the un-
precedented intervention of United States financial regulators to miti-
1. Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2002 Annual Report, BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY INC., 15, available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Frank D'Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark Mar-
kets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Markets, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 473, 477
(2010); Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 66 (2009).
3. See, e.g., 2003 G8 Summit Action Plan: Global Partnership Against The Spread of
Weapons And Materials of Mass Destruction, GROUP OF EIGHT,
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003 g8_summit/summit-documents/global_part
nershipagainst the spread of weapons andmaterialsofmass destruction_-
a_g8_actionplan.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
4. See Bart Chilton, Comm'r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, Stopping
Stammering: Overcoming Obstacles in Financial Regulatory Reform, Address Before the
Goldman Sachs Global Commodity Conference (Mar. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opachilton-43.html (addressing a poten-
tial "race to the bottom" absent international harmonization of rules regulating the massive
global derivatives market).
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gate the fallout from financial meltdown, Congress initiated a complete
overhaul of the U.S. financial regulatory regime with the highly antici-
pated Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) on July 21, 2010.6 Title VII of Dodd-Frank focuses ex-
clusively on remedying a host of problems surrounding the previously
unregulated OTC derivatives products that wreaked havoc on major fi-
nancial and insurance industry companies including Lehman Brothers
and American International Group (AIG).7
Overall, Title VII endeavors to reduce the systemic risks posed
by opaque derivatives contracts by mandating significant changes to
OTC derivatives trading.8  The overhaul makes several important
changes: requiring certain derivatives trades to be executed on exchang-
es, introducing a bifurcated OTC derivatives oversight authority for the
SEC and CFTC, as well as imposing central clearing on many OTC de-
rivatives contracts to mitigate counterparty credit risks.9 Additionally,
Title VII calls for the implementation of rules governing the collection
and posting of margin requirements for any swaps that are not cleared
through a third party.' 0
Congress presumably had the best of intentions in passing Title
5. See Report: Government Prepared to Lend $7.7 Trillion, THE HOUSTON CHRON.
(Nov. 24, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Report-Government-
prepared-to-lend-7-7-trillion-1589142.php.
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
7. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1641 (2010) (to be codified in scattered section of the U.S. Code); Moran,
supra note 2, at 40 (detailing how complex derivative products such as credit default swaps
were largely unregulated). See generally Commodities Futures Modernization Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(h) (2006) (exempting over-the-counter derivatives from regulation under the Commodi-
ties Exchange Act); LYNTON JONES, CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING THE OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO LONDON, CITY OF LONDON 7, available at
http://www.bourse-consult.com/wp-content/uploads/OTCDerivativesReportv21.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2012).
8. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act, 124 Stat. 1641.
9. See id.; Memorandum by Maurine R. Bartlett et al., Cadwalader Wickersham &
Taft LLP, The New Scheme for the Regulation of Swaps, with Appendices on Retroactivity,
Special Entities and Tax, Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act 1 (July 20, 2010),
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/clientfriend/072010_DF7.pdf; Aline van Duyn & Mi-
chael Mackenzie, Regulation: Pressures Mounting over Derivative Clearing, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.fl.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae8d7872-e607-1 1df-9cdd-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzlmOY7CypQ ("Clearing puts a third party in the middle of every
trade, which means the risks and costs of defaults are absorbed by the clearing-house mem-
bers.").
10. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act, 124 Stat. 1641.
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VII of Dodd-Frank and getting out in front of other major international
regulators. However, there are serious questions about the risks of
"regulatory arbitrage"" resulting from the lack of international harmo-
nization of regulations for OTC derivatives markets. 12 Assuming that
Title VII is fully implemented as it is written and the current joint regu-
latory rules proposals concerning margin requirements are adopted,
there is a very real possibility that the exploitation of "regulatory arbi-
trage" opportunities created by the first-mover position of the United
States will: (1) place U.S.-based banks at a competitive disadvantage
with their non-U.S. competitors; and (2) increase the global risk posed
by OTC derivatives as origination and trading migrates to jurisdictions
with less burdensome regulations.
Part II of this note examines the debate over the utility of OTC
derivatives products and why they have the potential to surreptitiously
torpedo the financial system.' 3  Then, Part III assesses the particular
Dodd-Frank provisions that are likely to foster regulatory arbitrage op-
portunities and competitive imbalances for affected financial institutions
when compared with the broadly similar European Union proposal for
derivatives reform known as European Market Infrastructure Regulation
(EMIR).14  This note concludes by suggesting that U.S. regulators
should carefully consider the competitive disadvantages that could re-
sult for U.S.-based financial services companies, as well as the potential
for off-shore derivatives risk concentration, before committing to a de-
rivatives regulation regime that does not account for extraterritorial reg-
ulatory positions.15
11. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs ofRegulatory Arbitrage, 22 J.
CoRP. L. 211, 211 (1996-1997) ('Regulatory arbitrage' refers to financial transactions de-
signed to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or
laws.").
12. See Chilton, supra note 4.
13. See infra PartlL.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS
A. Derivatives Contracts
Derivatives can be categorized into three distinct types of con-
tracts.16 The first category of derivative contracts are standardized, ex-
change-traded derivative arrangements commonly known as "listed de-
rivatives or futures."' 7 The other two categories of derivative contracts
are OTC derivatives or "swaps"' 8 and "cleared derivatives."l 9  These
contracts are privately bargained, highly customizable financial con-
tracts that directly transfer risk between the two parties to the arrange-
ment.20 Neither OTC derivatives nor "cleared derivatives" are traded on
exchanges. 2' The only salient difference between straight OTC deriva-
tives and "cleared derivatives" is that "cleared derivatives", similar to
"listed derivatives", are processed through a central clearing party that
acts as an intermediary between the two parties to the derivative con-
tract.22
Although exchange-traded derivatives greatly reduce the risk of
counterparty default and provide market participants with greater trans-
parency,23 these lower risk products are traditionally much less popular
16. See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT'L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES Ass'N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#l (last visited Dec. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter Product Descriptions].
17. Listed derivative products are traded on a centralized exchange and cleared with a
central counterparty. The significant difference between listed derivative and OTC deriva-
tives is that listed derivatives, unlike OTC derivative products, are not customizable to fit
the precise risk management needs of the derivative participant. See id
18. See id. (using the term "swap" interchangeably with "OTC derivatives" although





23. In the exchange-traded derivatives market, parties are subject to a margin require-
ment that provides a safety net for unexpected changes in the solvency of the other party.
Over-the-counter derivative contracts currently do not have a margin requirement, or a cen-
tralized counterparty to spread the risk of default across multiple parties. See Thomas Lee
Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes For Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, De-
rivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 428-
49 (2005); Product Descriptions, supra note 16; Denise Bedell, Exchange-traded Deriva-
tives Prove Their Worth, GLOBAL FIN., June 2009, available at
http://www.gfiag.com/archives/100-june-2009/1823-features-exchange-traded-derivatives-
prove-their-worth.html#axzzlZe9bph24 (explaining a recent resurgence in the number of
252
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than OTC derivatives. 24 Unlike exchange-traded derivatives, which fea-
ture highly standardized contracts applicable to a relatively limited
range of goods, 25 OTC derivatives provide risk managers with flexibil-
ity to design an agreement tailored to the specific needs of their organi-
zation. These customized agreements allow for the creation of an origi-
nal risk-transfer product based on an exact dollar value, interest or
currency rates, and the maturity date desired by the parties. 26 Addition-
ally, prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, OTC derivatives operated out-
side the purview of financial regulators and were not subject to the ap-
plication of margin requirements that apply to exchange-traded
derivatives.27
The relative advantages offered by OTC derivatives over ex-
change-traded derivatives are also accompanied by significant risks.28
Since most OTC derivatives transactions are settled between the parties
rather than through a centralized clearinghouse, 29 each party is exposed
to the risk of default by their contractual counterparty. 30 For exchange-
traded derivatives, the various exchanges provide a de facto guarantee
of the performance of the contract.31  For OTC derivatives contracts,
there is no guarantee of performance beyond the creditworthiness of the
direct counterparty. 32 This direct credit exposure arrangement has the
ability to cause a wave of defaults as the inability of one institution to
exchange-traded derivatives participants by noting "the reason for these figures becomes
clearer when considering where much of the value lies in the exchange-traded product:
transparency. With counterparty risk of prime concern to corporates in a post-Lehman
world, transparency throughout any and every financial trade is essential.").
24. The outstanding notional principal in billions of U.S. dollars in December 2010 for
OTC derivatives stood at 601,048 compared to 22,311.9 for derivatives traded on organized
exchanges. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, QUARTERLY REVIEW A131 tbl. 19 (Sept. 2011),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/rqal 109.pdf.
25. See, e.g., CME Group at a Glance, CME GROUP,
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (outlining the range
of standardized, exchange-traded derivatives products offered by one of the world's leading
derivative marketplaces).
26. See ROBERT W. KOLB, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 133 (1993).
27. See Commodities Futures Modernization Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2006) (exempting
over-the-counter derivatives from regulation under the Commodities Exchange Act).
28. See KOLB, supra note 26, at 133.
29. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES: SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES AND
COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT Foreword (Sept. 1998), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss27htm (finding that "the vast majority of OTC transactions are
settled bilaterally between the counterparties, rather than through clearing houses.").
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meet its derivative contracts could rapidly cause downstream institu-
tions to default on their payment obligations.33
B. The Benefits
It is quite ironic that derivatives, widely scorned as a core con-
tributor to the financial crisis of 2008, are financial instruments funda-
mentally aimed at managing and transferring risk.34 At the most basic
level, an OTC derivative is a financial agreement between two parties to
exchange something of value at a designated time in the future based on
the change in value of an underlying asset or the mere occurrence of a
predetermined event such as a creditor default.35 The underlying varia-
ble, which ultimately determines the nature and value of the derivative
contract, could range from interest rates to the amount of snow present
at a specific ski resort. 36
The enterprise-level benefit of derivatives contracts is their
unique ability to manage risks that could not be controlled through any
other financial mechanism.37 For instance, suppose an institutional fund
manager anticipates receiving $100,000 to invest in equities in six
months. 38 If the fund manager were to hold out for the entire six-month
period before receiving the capital, the fund would be exposed to the
uncertain risk posed by changes in equity valuations during the waiting
period. However, utilizing a financial derivative product known as an
equity index swap contract,39 the fund manager is able to lock into an




34. See D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 477.
35. See Product Descriptions, supra note 16.
36. The most common types of OTC derivatives include interest rate contracts, equity-
linked contracts, commodity contracts, and credit default swaps. Nonetheless, the underly-
ing variable that the derivative contract can refer to is limited only by the imagination of the
contracting parties. For instance, a ski resort might enter into a swap arrangement based on
the amount of snowfall measured at the ski resort to hedge against a decrease in visitors and
ensure positive cash flow in the event of low snowfall levels. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at
216.
37. See KOLB, supra note 26, at 17.
38. See id at 11-12.
39. For an equity index swap, at least one of the two contracting parties payment obli-
gation is determined by the value of an equity index. This type of swaps product can be
used to gain the benefits of a direct equity index transaction without actually making an in-
vestment in the index. See Don M. Chance, Equity Swaps and Equity Investing 2 (La. State
254 [Vol. 16
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exposure to potential upward swings in the price of the underlying index
six months before the investable capital is available. 40 The equity index
swap product allows the fund manager to guarantee an immediate expo-
sure to movements in the targeted index. This sort of transaction typi-
fies the unique advantage of derivatives products as it allows prudent
users to take investment positions that would otherwise be unavaila-
ble.41
C. The Risks
Derivatives can be utilized in an effective manner by financial
institutions to hedge risk and prevent lending losses.4 2 However, a par-
ticular category of derivatives known as OTC derivatives or "swaps"
contracts, entered into frequently by financial institutions, is accompa-
nied by significant institution-level and system-wide43 risks.4 On the
one hand, OTC derivatives constitute a vast majority of the over $600
trillion global derivatives market and are strongly favored by parties
Univ., Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://www.bus.1su.edu/finance/research/working%20papers/equityswapsandequityinvesting
.pdf.
40. See KOLB, supra note 26, at 11-12.
41. See id at 17.
42. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks Before the Council on
Foreign Relations: International Financial Risk Management, (Nov. 19, 2002),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021119/default.htm ("More re-
cently, instruments that are more complex and less transparent-such as credit default
swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and credit-linked notes-have been developed and
their use has grown very rapidly in recent years. The result? Improved credit-risk manage-
ment together with more and better risk-management tools appear to have significantly re-
duced loan concentrations in telecommunications and, indeed, other areas and the associated
stress on banks and other financial institutions. More generally, such instruments appear to
have effectively spread losses from defaults by Enron, Global Crossing, Railtrack, World-
Com, Swissair, and sovereign Argentinian credits over the past year to a wider set of banks
than might previously have been the case in the past, and from banks, which have largely
short-term leverage, to insurance firms, pension funds, or others with diffuse long-term lia-
bilities or no liabilities at all.").
43. Defining systemic risk as "[t]he risk that a default by one market participant will
have repercussions on other participants due to the interlocking nature of financial markets.
For example, Customer A's default in X market may affect intermediary B' ability to fulfill
its obligations in Markets X, Y, and Z." See A Guide to the Language of The Futures Indus-
try, COMMODITIES FuTUREs TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/glossarys (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011).
44. See D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 491.
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seeking to manage risk.45 However, these customized OTC derivatives
contracts also represent a threat to the economy as a whole if they are
left wholly unregulated as they were prior to the passage of Title VII of
Dodd-Frank.46
An example of the propensity for OTC derivatives to result in a
cascading wave of defaults, massive financial losses, and paralyzed
credit markets is the global financial crisis of 2008.47 As the housing
market thrived from 2000 to 2006 due to low borrowing costs and easily
accessible credit, 48 financial institutions sold the newly minted mort-
gages to be packaged into a once popular form of asset-backed debt se-
curity known as collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO). 4 9 This al-
lowed financial institutions to raise funds for additional mortgages and
distance the institution from the risk associated with the mortgages it
originated.o A CMO is a debt security composed of a portfolio of
mortgage-backed securities.5 1  The CMO receives cash flows from the
repayment of a pool of mortgage debt.52 In the low interest environ-
ment of the time, many institutional investors were attracted to the
higher returns offered by CMOs when compared to more traditional col-
lateralized debt obligations whose returns were based on corporate bond
payments. 53 However, the investors' underlying assumption that hous-
ing prices would continue to rise and that subprime borrowers54 would
45. The Bank for International Settlements reports that, as of December 2010, the no-
tional amounts outstanding for over-the-counter derivatives in Switzerland and the GIO
countries was $601,048 billion. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 24, at A131
tbl. 19. The report also states that the notional principal of derivative financial instruments
traded on organized exchanges as of June 2011 was $30,114.6 billion. See id at Al36 tbl.
23A. Based on this report, over-the-counter derivative make up 95.22 percent of the overall
derivative marketplace. See id.
46. See D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 491.
47. See Duffie, supra note 33, at 5-6.
48. See D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 488.
49. See id. at 485-86.
50. See id. at 487.
51. See Duffie, supra note 33, at 5.
52. See id.
53. Collateralized Debt Obligations, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/collateralized-debt-
obligations/index.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2011).
54. "The term 'subprime' refers to the credit characteristics of individual borrowers.
Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories that include payment delin-
quencies, and possibly more severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and bankrupt-
cies. They may also display reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit scores, debt-
to-income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass borrowers with incomplete credit his-
tories. Subprime loans are loans to borrowers displaying one or more of these characteristics
256 [Vol. 16
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be able to fulfill their mortgage obligations proved to be fatally flawed
as the housing "bubble" burst in 2007." The once highly attractive
mortgage-backed securities were rendered worthless as the cash flow
from the underlying mortgages quickly dried up.56
Some sophisticated CMO investors were not totally unaware of
the risks posed by mortgage default, and took steps to hedge their de-
fault risk exposure by utilizing a popular OTC derivative known as a
credit default swap (CDS). The CDS agreement involves a protection
buyer paying a periodic premium to a protection seller in return for the
protection seller's promise to compensate the protection buyer upon the
occurrence of a credit event such as default.s7 This de facto insurance
policy for CMOs was sold by large insurance companies such as AIG in
such a high volume that the wave of defaults during the housing crisis
resulted in some protection sellers being unable to fulfill their CDS
payment obligations. The failure of CDS protection sellers, like AIG,
to fulfill their obligations then caused significant losses for financial in-
stitutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Steams, who relied on
CDSs to fulfill downstream derivatives obligations. 59 The dominos of
the crisis continued to fall as the derivatives counterparties of major in-
vestment banks moved their derivatives positions from weakened in-
vestment banks to other derivatives dealers.60 This "flight to quality"
had the effect of withdrawing precious capital from these increasingly
illiquid institutions.6 1 Ironically, the widespread use of unregulated
OTC derivatives, generally intended to mitigate risk exposure, greatly
exacerbated the economic impact of the housing crisis. 62
at the time of origination or purchase. Such loans have a higher risk of default than loans to
prime borrowers." ComE-IN Background Definitions, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/comeinibackground.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
55. See D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 490; KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME
LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 6 (2008), available at
http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/Subprime WP rev.pdf (detailing dou-
ble digit declines in housing valuations following a period of unsustainable overvaluation
from 2001 to 2005).
56. See D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 490.
57. See id. at 484.
58. See Duffie, supra note 33, at 6.
59. See id. at 6-7.
60. See id
61. See id.
62. D'Souza et al., supra note 2, at 484; see also The Financial Crisis and the Role of
Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th
Cong. 20 (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
257
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III. DODD-FRANK DERIVATIVES REGULATIONS AND THE REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE DILEMMA
Title VII of Dodd-Frank attempts to assuage the problems of
counterparty credit risk and the lack of transparency in the OTC deriva-
tives market.63 Title VII adopts a bifurcated regulatory structure where-
by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is granted
regulatory authority over "swaps" and participants in the swaps market,
and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is given authority over
"security-based swaps" and participants in the security-based swaps
market.64 The legislation seeks to achieve its goals of increasing swaps
market transparency and reducing systemic risk in financial markets by
requiring: (1) either the divestiture or spin off of derivatives activities to
an affiliated company for banks;65 (2) with limited exceptions, the cen-
tral clearing and exchange trading of OTC derivatives; 66 (3) the imposi-
tion of capital requirements for all registered swap entitieS67 and margin
requirements for all swaps that are not cleared by a central clearing
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110house hearings&docid=f:55764.pdf (statement of Christopher
Cox, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n).
63. See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1641 (2010) (to be codified in scattered section of the U.S. Code).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (Supp. IV 2010). Section 721(a)(42) of Dodd-Frank pro-
vides that a "security-based swap" has the meaning given to the term in section 3(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a). Section 3(a)(68) of the
Exchange Act, as added by section 761(a)(6) of Dodd-Frank and codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(68), defines a "security-based swap" to include swaps based on a narrow-based secu-
rity index, a single security or loan, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event relating to
a single issuer of a security or the issuers of securities in a narrow-based security exchange
that directly affects the financial situation of the issuer; Further Definition of "Swap," "Se-
curity-Based Swap," and "Security-Based Swap Agreement"; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based
Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,818 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
65. 15 U.S.C § 8305.
66. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 2010).
67. Dodd Frank requires "swaps dealers" and "major swap participants" to register
with the CFTC and comply with any promulgated regulations. 7 U.S.C § 6s. In a parallel
fashion, Dodd Frank requires "security-based swaps dealers" and "major security-based
swaps participants" to register and comply with SEC regulations for security-based swaps.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-8. The Title VII definition of "swap dealer" embraces the same functional
approach utilized to define a securities dealer in Section 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See Memorandum by Maurine R. Bartlett et al., supra note 9. A "swap deal-
er" is defined as any person who: i) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; ii) makes a market
in swaps; iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of busi-
ness for its own account; or iv) engages in activity commonly known in the trade as a dealer
or market maker in swaps. 7 U.S.C. § la(49)(A).
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house;68 (4) the compilation of detailed books and record keeping in or-
der to provide a clearer window into the derivatives market; 69 and (5)
the establishment of position limits for exchange-traded derivatives and
derivatives that have a "significant price discovery function." 70
While the mandates of Title VII represent an admirable step to-
wards reining in the $600 trillion7' global derivatives marketplace, the
fact that the United States jumped ahead of other financial regulators in
passing Title VII has created an environment in which differential regu-
latory standards in major international derivatives markets will prevail
absent international harmonization of OTC derivatives regulation.7 2
The unintended consequences of this uneven regulatory playing field
include the concentration of derivatives risk in the most hospitable ju-
risdictions and a competitive disadvantage for U.S. financial firms. 73
These risks are even more pronounced when one considers that OTC
derivatives activity is truly global in nature,74 and that the overall mar-
ket value of OTC derivatives in London is forty-three percent of the to-
tal OTC derivatives market compared to New York's twenty-four per-
cent share of the OTC derivative marketplace.75 A comparison of Title
VII of Dodd-Frank and the relatively similar European Union proposal
for OTC derivatives regulation, known as the European Market Infra-
structure Regulation (EMIR),76 reveals that even slight variations can
68. 7 U.S.C. § 6s. A "major swap participant" is defined as any person who is not a
swap dealer but: i) maintains a substantial position in swaps excluding positions held for
hedging and risk management and employee benefit plans; ii) has swaps positions that could
have a significant detrimental impact on the financial stability of U.S. banks or financial
markets; or iii) is financial entity not subject to capital requirements established by Federal
banking regulators and maintains a substantial position in a major swap category. 7 U.S.C.
§la.
69. 7 U.S.C. § 6s.
70. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a).
71. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 24, at A131 tbl. 19.
72. Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 16-17 (2011) [hereinafter Barry Zubrow Testimony],
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ZubrowHFSC.pdf (statement
of Barry Zubrow, Chief Risk Officer, J.P. Morgan Chase Co.).
73. See Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the
H Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 18-19 (2011) [hereinafter Mary L. Schapiro Testimo-
ny], available at http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/112-39.pdf (statement of
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n).
74. See id
75. See JONES, supra note 7, at 6.
76. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, COM (2010) 484 final (Sept.
15, 2010), available at http://eur-
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have a significant effect on the risk for regulatory arbitrage and compet-
itive imbalance for U.S. based financial institutions competing in the
global marketplace. The three Title VII mandates differing most signif-
icantly from the proposed EMIR regulations and posing the greatest risk
of regulatory arbitrage and competitive challenges for U.S. financial in-
stitutions include: the section 716 swaps push-out rule,77 the section 731
margin requirements for swaps,78 and the section 764 requirements for
security-based swaps.79  Additionally, an examination of the possible
extraterritorial reach of these particular Title VII regulations to non-U.S.
operations of large U.S.-based financial holding companies will guide
the discussion of regulatory arbitrage and competitive deficiencies for
U.S. banks.
A. Section 716 Swaps Push-Out Rule
The Swaps Push-Out Rule of Title VII, section 716, prohibits
any firm defined as a swaps entity8' from receiving "federal assis-
tance."82 Federal assistance is defined in section 716(b)(1) to include
access to Federal Reserve credit facilities, the Federal Reserve discount
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:520 1 0PCO484:EN:NOT.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (Supp. IV 2010).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 6s (Supp. IV 2010).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6.
80. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i)(1)-(2); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd.
81. Swaps entity is defined as any firm that qualifies as a "swap dealer", "security-
based swap dealer", "major swap participant", or "major security-based swap participant.".
15 U.S.C § 8305. The term "swap dealer" is defined functionally to include any entity that:
"i) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; ii) makes a market in swaps; iii) regularly enters into
swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account; or iv) en-
gages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known as a dealer or market maker
in swaps. . . ." 7 U.S.C. § la. Proposed regulations on the definition of "swap dealer" pro-
vide additional criteria for determining whether an institution qualifies as a swap dealer.
The proposed regulations state that, generally, swap dealers and security-based swap dealers
have the following distinguishing characteristics: i) "tend to accommodate demand for
swaps and security-based swaps;" ii) "are generally available to enter into swaps or security-
based swaps to facilitate other parties interest in entering into those instruments;" iii) "tend
not to request that other parties propose the terms of swaps or security-based swaps; rather,
dealers tend to enter into those instruments on their own standard terms or on terms they
arrange in response to other parties' interest;" and iv) "tend to be able to arrange customized
terms for swaps or security-based swaps upon request, or to create new types of swaps or
security-based swaps at the dealer's own initiative.". See Further Definition of "Swap Deal-
er," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based
Swap Participant," and "Eligible Contract Participant", 75 Fed. Reg. 80174, 80176 (pro-
posed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 8305.
2012] INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY ARBITRA GE
window, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance
or guarantees.83 Since all national banks, federal thrifts, state member
banks, and state non-member banks and thrifts that offer retail banking
services are required to maintain FDIC insurance, 84 the practical effect
of section 716 is that all banks qualifying as swaps entities will be
forced to either cease their non-exempt OTC derivatives business or
create a separately capitalized affiliated swap entity pursuant to section
716(c).ss
Currently, the proposed EMIR OTC derivatives regulations do
not include a provision equivalent to the Swaps Push-Out Rule. 86 Some
national government coalitions such as the Liberal Democrats in the UK
coalition government are examining ways to reduce potential taxpayer
costs in the world of "too big to fail" and have considered the possibility
of a structural separation for certain financial activities." Beyond this
reference to a regulation similar to the Swaps Push-Out Rule by the
Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom, there is no indication that
the final EU OTC derivatives regulations will require the segregation of
swaps activity from primary depository banking institutions.8 8
83. Id
84. Memorandum by Scott A. Cammarn et al., Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP,
The Lincoln Amendment: Banks, Swap Dealers, National Treatment and Future of the
Amendment 1 (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter The Lincoln Amendment],
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client-friend/121410FutureoftheLincoln
Amendment.pdf.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 8305(c). See also The Lincoln Amendment, supra note 84, at 1.
86. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, COM (2010) 484 final (Sept.
15, 2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010PCO484:EN:NOT.
87. See INDEP. COMM'N ON BANKING, ISSUES PAPER: CALL FOR EVIDENCE 32-36 (2010),
available at http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/Issues-Paper-24-September-20 10.pdf.
88. Memorandum by Azam Aziz et al., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Proposed US and
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1. Section 716 Exemptions
In response to high-profile criticism 89 of the original Senate ver-
sion of the bill calling for a total prohibition of OTC derivatives activity
on the part of federally assisted financial firms,90 the final version of the
Swaps Push-Out Rule includes noteworthy exemptions that lessen the
potential burden on affected banks.91 In particular, the section 716(d)
provisions exempt certain widely utilized derivatives products such as
interest rate swaps, 92 and swaps referencing assets that banks are per-
mitted to invest in pursuant to section 24 (Seventh) of the National
Bank Act. 9 However, one interesting carve-out from these exemptions
is the requirement that CDS transactions must be cleared through a de-
rivatives clearing organization to qualify for the section 716(d)(2) ex-
emption.94 Furthermore, the prohibition on certain swaps activity with-
in the depository institution only applies to swaps or security-based
swaps that are entered into after the end of the up to thirty-six month
transition period outlined in section 716(f). 95
The section 716(d) exemptions from the Swaps Push-Out Rule
have very significant implications for U.S. financial institutions. For
U.S. banks engaged in derivatives activity, the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC) data from the third quarter of 2011 indicates
that exempt interest rates derivatives constitute approximately eighty-
one percent of total derivatives notional value.96 The report also indi-
89. See Letter from Chairman Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Sen.
Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (May 12,
2010), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/14/bernanke-forcing-banks-
to n_576057.html; Letter from Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Sen.
Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs & Sen.
Blanche Lincoln, Chairman, Comm. On Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry (Apr. 30, 2010), re-
printed in 156 Cong. Rec. S3069-70 (daily ed. May 4,2010).
90. S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 716 (2010).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 8305(c) (Supp. IV 2010). See also The Lincoln Amendment, supra
note 84, at 6-7.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 8305(d)(2).
93. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006) (enumerating the assets banks are eligible to
invest in).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 8305(d)(2)-(3).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 8305(e).
96. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT
ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES THIRD QUARTER 2011 tbl. 3 (2011) [here-
inafter OCC THIRD QUARTER 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq3 11.pdf.
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cates that exempt foreign currency exchange derivatives account for ap-
proximately eleven percent of total notional value.97 For example, the
four commercial banks with the highest derivative exposure by notional
value include JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA; Citibank, NA; Bank of
America, NA and Goldman Sachs Bank USA.98 These banks would on-
ly have exposure to the Swaps Push-Out Rule for 11.4 percent, 6.5 per-
cent, 9.4 percent, and 1.2 percent of the total notional value of their de-
rivatives portfolios respectively." Thus, these particular exemptions
have made the Swaps Push-Out Rule much more tolerable for U.S.
commercial banks than they would have been otherwise.
2. Operating Structure Choices
Even with the above mentioned exemptions, if U.S. commercial
banks subject to the Swaps Push-Out Rule do not cease their non-
exempt swaps activity altogether, these institutions must either: (1) di-
vide their swaps activity between exempt and non-exempt swaps and
push the non-exempt swaps into an affiliated entity; or (2) push the en-
tire swaps business into an affiliated entity.'00 Neither of these opera-
tional structures is very compelling for covered banks, as they both im-
pose additional costs and organizational headaches that U.S. banks'
European competitors will not be forced to confront.101
In the first scenario, an affected U.S. bank would move only its
non-exempt swaps activity into a separate affiliated entity that would
act as a counterparty for all non-exempt swaps transactions.' 02 This re-
striction would create an uncomfortable scenario for swaps clients of
the bank, as customers would now have to deal with two separate legal
entities to satisfy all of their swaps needs. The client would sacrifice
the efficiencies generated by dealing with a single legal entity including
payment'0 3 and close-out netting. 104 Additionally, the parties would al-
97. See id.; J.P. MORGAN CAZENOVE, REGULATORY ARBITRAGE SERIES: OW EUROPEAN
OVER US lBs 71 (2011), available at https://mm.jpmorgan.com/stp/t/c.do?i=5930E-
12&u=a p*d 558208.pdf*h_-2igf3ms.
98. OCC THIRD QUARTER 2011 REPORT, supra note 96, at tbl. 3.
99. Id. See also J.P. MORGAN CAZENOVE, supra note 97, at 71.
100. See The Lincoln Amendment, supra note 84, at 7-8.
101. See id.
102. See J.P. MORGAN CAZENOVE, supra note 97, at 63.
103. Payment netting reduces the total swaps payments due between counterparties to a
single net payment. Simply put, if Counterparty A owes Counterparty B $100.00 and Coun-
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so have to undertake significant documentation expenses to account for
the re-arrangement of the transactional relationship between swaps
counterparties.s05  One distinct advantage of this divided operational
structure is that the cost of funding the smaller affiliated entity will like-
ly be much lower than capitalizing a completely separate affiliated enti-
ty for all swaps transactions.106
The second approach involving the divestiture of the entire
swaps business would require the institution to seek funds for an affili-
ated entity at market rates for the cost of capital rather than the below
market cost of capital enjoyed by banks with access to the Federal Re-
serve discount window.107 This cost of capital issue is the strongest fac-
tor vitiating against a total push-out of the entire swaps business into an
affiliated entity. 08 Although the operational hurdles presented by the
dual swaps arrangement would be avoided under this option, the de-
creased profit margins for swaps activities resulting from the increased
cost of capital and capital requirements for swaps dealers' 09 make this
option much less attractive for these bottom-line oriented organiza-
tions.no Irrespective of which organizational structure is embraced by
banks impacted by the Swaps Push-Out Rule, the swaps customers will
now be engaging in swaps transactions with smaller, less capitalized in-
stitutions."' Additionally, the Swaps Push-Out Rule shifts fairly risky
terparty B owes Counterparty A $75.00, then Counterparty A makes a single payment of
$25.00 to settle the debts between the two parties in one fell swoop.
104. Close-out netting allows for a single payment to settle final amount owed between
counterparties following default by one of the counterparties. See Product Descriptions, su-
pra note 16.
105. Letter from Barclays Bank PLC et al., to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, Commodities
Futures Trading Comm'n et al. (Jan. 11, 2011), 2011 WL 403237.
106. See J.P. MORGAN CAZENOVE, supra note 97, at 66.
107. See id. at 66-67.
108. See The Lincoln Amendment, supra note 84, at 8.
109. Pursuant to section 731 of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC is required to adopt capital re-
quirements for non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies that qualify as swap deal-
ers or major swap participants. The currently proposed rule would subject these non-bank
subsidiary swap dealers and major swap participants to the capital adequacy guidelines ap-
plicable to the bank holding company under 12 CFR part 225. Of course, unlike the bank
holding company, the affiliated entity would not have the benefit of accessing the discount
window to fulfill the capital requirement. Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,802, 27,802 (proposed May 12, 2011) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 23 and 140).
110. See J.P. MORGAN CAZENOVE, supra note 97, at 65-66.
111. See Letter from Laura J. Schisgall, Managing Dir & Senior Counsel, Societe Gen-
erale, to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n et al. (Feb. 18,
2011), 2011 WL 2208257.
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swaps transactions from the "best capitalized and most highly rated en-
tity" in the bank holding company to an affiliated organization that has
a limited asset base outside of the swaps business itself.112 It is hard to
deny that banks subject to the section 716 organizational reshuffling
will face a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign banks not
subject to the regulations as they compete for swaps customers on a
global scale."13
B. Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps
Another example of a direct competitive imbalance that U.S.-
based firms affected by the Title VII might encounter is the application
of a higher margin requirement for non-U.S. swaps transactions com-
pared to the margin requirement applicable to foreign competitors in the
local jurisdiction.1 4 Pursuant to section 731 for swaps and section 764
for security-based swaps," 5 the prudential regulators for banks and oth-
er entities that are subject to regulation by a prudential regulator are re-
quired to impose minimum initial and variation margin requirements for
all swaps transactions that are not cleared through a registered swap
clearing organization.1 6 In setting margin requirements for non-cleared
swaps, the SEC, CFTC, and the prudential regulators are instructed to
impose requirements that ensure the "safety and soundness of the swap
dealer or major swap participant.""17 Additionally, regulators are in-
structed to develop margin requirements that are "appropriate for the
risk associated with non-cleared swaps held as a swap dealer or major
swap participant."" 8 The proposed rules released by the prudential reg-
ulators vary the amount of initial" 9 and variation1 2 0 margin that is re-
112. See id.
113. See The Lincoln Amendment, supra note 84, at 8.
114. Letter from Bank of America Corp. et al., to Elizabeth Murhphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch.
Comm'n et al. (Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 2208296.
115. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)(2) (Supp. IV 2010).
116. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)(2)(A).
117. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)(3)(A)(i).
118. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)(3)(A)(ii).
119. Initial margin collateral that is posted on the front of the transaction to guard
against potential market and counterparty risks. Financial Glossary: Initial Margin,
REUTERS, http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php/Initial Margin (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
120. Variation margin is the posting of additional funds to adjust for negative market
movements. Financial Glossary: Variation Margin, REUTERS,
http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php?title=Variation Margin&diff-11341&oldid=11340
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quired to be collected depending on the type of counterparties involved
in the transaction. 121 For the purposes of calculating the initial margin
requirement, the proposal allows swap entities to utilize either an inter-
nal model approved by the applicable regulator or a standardized mar-
gin model.122 The standardized model calculates the margin require-
ment as a percentage of the notional amount of the swap.123  The
applicable percentage assessment varies based on the type of swap and
the nature of the counterparties. 124 The proposed rules also state that the
permissible collateral for satisfaction of margin requirements is limited
to immediately-available cash, any obligation which is a direct obliga-
tion or fully guaranteed obligation of the United States, as well as senior
debt obligations of certain government-sponsored entities for initial
margin only. 125 For affected U.S. based financial institutions, the im-
plementation of these proposals will increase the cost of OTC swaps
transactions for their derivatives clients and tie up investable bank capi-
tal in margin accounts.126
Although the EMIR proposal also contemplates margin re-
quirements for centrally cleared derivatives transactions and swap enti-
ties participating in non-cleared swaps,' 27 there is currently no guarantee
that the margin requirements will be equally stringent. 128 Also, even
with the extension of exemptive relief from swaps regulation until July
(last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
121. Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,564,
27,567 (proposed May 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
122. See id at 27,567-68.
123. See id
124. See id at 27,568; Memorandum by Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Regulators Pro-
pose Swap Margin and Capital Rules (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/a4c40eel-b508-440a-a806-
0039b0dd1d78/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/lfcc4a70-flff-4053-bO15-
0441b700116e/041411_DavisPolkSwap CapitalMarginRules.pdf [hereinafter Davis
Polk Memo].
125. Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. at
27,578.
126. See, e.g., Letter from Bank of America Corp. et al., supra note 114 (referencing the
risk of competitive disadvantage resulting from heightened transaction costs relative to un-
covered foreign competitors); Davis Polk Memo, supra note 124, at 2 (noting that the prohi-
bition on reinvesting segregated margin funds for non-cleared swaps transactions between
two swap entities could impose a "large opportunity cost" for banks).
127. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, COM (2010) 484 final (Sept.
15, 2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010PCO484:EN:NOT.
128. See Barry Zubrow Testimony, supra note 72, at 16.
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16, 2012 by the CFTC,129 it is likely that U.S. margin regulations will be
effective prior to the implementation of EU margin regulations, which
industry experts do not expect to be implemented until 2013 at the earli-
est.' 30
Considering the distinct possibility for disparate substantive
standards and implementation timelines for margin requirements, 31 one
of the most striking aspects of the prudential regulators' proposed rules
on margin requirements for non-cleared swaps is the extraterritorial
reach of the requirements. 132 The proposed rules apply to all swaps
transactions of all non-U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates of any U.S. enti-
ty.133  The margin rules only exempt from coverage "foreign non-
cleared swaps" and "foreign non-cleared security-based swaps." 34 A
"foreign non-cleared swap" is defined as a swaps transaction between a
"foreign covered swap entity" and a foreign counterparty.135 A "foreign
covered swap entity" is defined as a swap entity that is:
1) Not a company organized under the laws of the Unit-
ed States or any State; 2) Not a branch or office of a
company organized under the law of the United States
or any State; 3) Not a U.S. branch, agency, subsidiary of
a foreign bank; and 4) Not controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by a company that is organized under the laws of
the United States or any State.136
As a result of this narrow exception from coverage, U.S. finan-
cial holding companies with domestic and overseas subsidiary swaps
businesses servicing foreign clients, such as JP Morgan Chase & Co.,
will be placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to European
banks that would qualify as exempt foreign swap entities.137 If the cur-
129. Effective Date for Swap Regulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,999, 65,999-00 (proposed
Oct. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1).
130. See Barry Zubrow Testimony, supra note 72, at 16.
131. See id
132. Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,564,
27,580-81 (proposed May 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, and 34).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 27,591.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Barry Zubrow Testimony, supra note 72, at 16.
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rent proposed rules are implemented, and the E.U. does not implement
margin requirements that are more stringent or equal to the U.S. margin
requirements, many industry experts believe the U.S. banks will not be
able to compete in the global market and will essentially be forced to
concede this book of business to European and Asian competitors.13 8
For instance, a hypothetical Dutch pension fund seeking to engage in a
swaps transaction would be forced to post margin with U.S. banks but
could avoid the burden altogether in a transaction with a non-U.S. bank
during an anticipated lag period between U.S. and E.U. effective
dates. 139 Additionally, this hypothetical Dutch pension fund could also
obtain reduced margin requirement in transactions with non-U.S. banks
if the eventual E.U. margin requirements are less stringent than those
for U.S. banks. 140 In this scenario, a potential foreign swaps customer
will presumably shift its swaps activity to the entity offering a similar
swaps contract with lower transaction costs. 141 Overseas swaps activi-
ties are vitally important within the framework of the global integrated
client model employed by large U.S.-based financial holding compa-
nies.142 A disparate and uneven international regulatory stance on mar-
gin requirements for non-cleared swaps in the two largest markets for
OTC derivatives would have negative competitive and bottom-line im-
plications for already weakened U.S. financial holding companies. 14 3
C. Extraterritoriality and Global Competitiveness Implications
The magnitude of the regulatory arbitrage risks and competitive
disadvantage problems associated with disparate global derivatives
standards cannot be fully ascertained until the SEC and CFTC make
138. See, e.g., id at 17; Tom Braithwaite, Lawmakers Warn on Derivatives Rules, FIN.
TIMES, May 17, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cmss/0/d42092aa-802f-I1eO-
866d-00 144feabdcO.html#axzz 1 aQQRZct9
139. The Financial Stability Board reports that the European Union will not have legis-
lation in place before 2013 and that "most other jurisdictions have not yet made basic deci-
sions about regulatory measures, including whether any regulatory action will be taken."
Daniel Pruzin, FSB Says G-20 Countries Falling Behind In Implementing Controls on OTC
Markets, BANKING DAILY (BNA). Oct. 12, 2011, available at
http://new.bna.com/bldn/display/batchjprintdisplay.adp?searchid+ 15944080.
140. See Barry Zubrow Testimony, supra note 72, at 16.
141. Letter from Bank of America Corp. et al., supra note 114.
142. See Barry Zubrow Testimony, supra note 72, at 17 (highlighting the "vital im-
portance" of overseas derivatives to U.S. financial companies).
143. See id.
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clear the extent to which Title VII mandates will apply to the non-U.S.
entities of large U.S. financial holding companies like Bank of America
Corporation and JP Morgan Chase & Co. 144 The essential question is
whether non-U.S. entities of U.S. financial holding companies will be
considered swap dealers under section 721 or security-based swap deal-
ers pursuant to section 761.145 If these off-shore entities qualify as swap
dealers, then they would need to register with either the SEC or CFTC,
and would be subject to the full gamut of Title VII derivatives regula-
tions that their foreign-based competitors could avoid entirely. 14 6
In making this determination, the SEC, CFTC, and U.S. bank
regulators find themselves in a dilemma of sorts. If they decide to apply
Title VII derivatives regulation on an extraterritorial basis, then global
U.S.-based financial holding companies would be placed at a distinct
competitive disadvantage to foreign competitors who do not have to
deal with the cost burdens of dual U.S and foreign regulatory compli-
ance. 14 7 On the other hand, in the absence of equally stringent deriva-
tives regulations in foreign trading markets, the exemption of non-U.S.
subsidiaries from the mandates of Title VII would represent a signifi-
cant loophole in the new derivatives regulatory regime. 148
In addition to the argument that extraterritorial application of Ti-
tle VII will result in a competitive disadvantage for U.S.-based partici-
pants in the global derivatives market, potentially impacted organiza-
tions also argue that the statutory language vitiates the application of
Title VII to non-U.S. derivative operations.14 9 Section 722(d)(i) and
section 772(b) establish limitations on the extraterritorial application of
Title VII regulations for swaps and security-based swaps respective-
ly.150 For swaps, section 722(d) states that the rules promulgated in Ti-
tle VII:




148. See Victoria McGrane, Global Standards Sought on Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2011, at C9, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190449170457657
3002318988540.html (discussing the impact of foreign subsidiary losses on the U.S. com-
merce).
149. See Letter from Bank of America Corp. et al., supra note 114; Letter from Kenneth
E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice President, Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, to David A. Sta-
wick, Sec'y, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n et al. (Feb. 3, 2011), 2011 WL
2208318.
150. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(c) (Supp. IV 2010).
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shall not apply to activities outside the United States un-
less those activities: 1) have a direct and significant
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of
the United States; or 2) contravene such rules or regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe or promulgate as
are necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of
this Act that was enacted by [Title VII].s15
Similarly, for security-based swaps, section 772(b) prohibits ex-
traterritorial application of Title VII to activities of individuals transact-
ing business "without the jurisdiction of the United States" unless the
individual is in violation of a regulation intended to prevent the evasion
of Title VII's mandate.152 Potentially affected U.S.-based financial in-
stitutions contend that these extraterritorial limits represent a Congres-
sional intent to preserve the established principle that, absent a clear in-
tent to the contrary, U.S. legislation is not meant to be effective outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 153 Furthermore, they ar-
gue that the mere connection of their foreign swap operations with the
U.S.-based financial holding company does not satisfy the "direct and
significant" connection or effect test for extraterritorial application of
Title VII considering that these affiliates agree they will limit their ac-
tivity to wholly non-U.S. transactions with non-U.S. counterparties.154
On the other side of that contention, a U.S.-based financial holding
company is responsible for losses accruing to its subsidiary entities, and
thus these foreign swap operations do have a direct effect on U.S. com-
merce and would satisfy the criteria for extraterritorial application of Ti-
tle VII.155 For instance, a strong counterpoint to the argument that U.S.
banks and financial companies should be exempted from oversight
when dealing with non-U.S. clients is the fact that a majority of AIG's
credit default swap counterparties during the financial crisis were for-
151. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i)(1)-(2).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(c).
153. See Letter from Bank of America Corp. et al., supra note 114; Morrison v. Nat'1
Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
154. See Letter from Bank of America Corp. et al., supra note 114.
155. See, e.g., McGrane, supra note 148 (discussing the impact of foreign subsidiary
losses on the U.S. commerce); Letter from Americans for Financial Reform, to Chairman
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eign bank clients of AIG.156 Certainly, these AIG swap contracts with
foreign-based clients severely threatened the stability of the U.S. econ-
omy.157
Additionally, if the non-U.S. swaps operations are exempted
from Title VII regulations, there is a distinct possibility that U.S.-based
financial holding companies would shift the bulk of their swaps trading
activity to more hospitable jurisdictions.15 8 This could potentially result
in the concentration of financial risk in jurisdictions with the most fa-
vorable regulatory regime as companies exploit the regulatory arbitrage
opportunity presented by disparate regulations.159  This result would
clearly be counter to Title VII's primary goal of reigning in the risks as-
sociated with OTC derivatives.
IV. CONCLUSION
An attractive solution to the competitive imbalance and risk
concentration threats posed by regulatory arbitrage is ensuring that ma-
terial EU and U.S. derivatives regulations are harmonized. Even some
of the leading political proponents of more stringent U.S. derivatives
regulations have called for the international harmonization of deriva-
tives regulations after considering the "significant competitive disad-
vantage for U.S. firms operating globally" that would result from an un-
even regulatory playing field. 160 Also, leading U.S. regulators including
Treasury Secretary Geithner have publicly acknowledged and embraced
the need for alignment of derivatives regulations with the European Un-
ion.161 The most sensible regulatory approach would be to proactively
156. Cyrus Sanati, How Wall Street Kills Financial Reform Rules, CNNMONEY TERM
SHEET (June 6, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/06/how-wall-
street-kills-financial-reform-rules/.
157. Id.
158. See Rich Blake, Wall Street Eyes Moving Trading to Switzerland, ABC NEWS (May
25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wall-street-response-financial-reforms-move-
trading-offshore/story?id=10730538&page=2 (noting that large financial institutions were
examining off-shore alternatives for their derivatives trading activity).
159. Michael J. McFarlin, Avoiding Race To Bottom On Regs, FUTURES MAGAZINE (July
1, 2011), http://www.futuresmag.com/Issues/201 1/July-201 1/Pages/Avoiding-race-to-
bottom-on-regs.aspx ("A big concern is regulatory arbitrage as non-U.S. jurisdictions poten-
tially can undercut our new and tougher standards.").
160. Letter from Sen. Charles Schumer et al., to Chairman Ben Bernanke, Chairman,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al. (May 17, 2011), available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/record_print.cfm?id=332906.
161. Timothy Geithner, Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks to the International
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work with foreign regulators to ensure regulatory parity on the key
items of derivatives reform.' 62 This would enable the United States to
maintain the basic framework of the much-needed Title VII derivatives
legislation without risking a destructive "race to the bottom" or a com-
petitive disadvantage for U.S. firms.163 Although the end result of in-
ternational harmonization efforts hangs in the balance, it is clear that
removing the attendant risks of regulatory arbitrage will be integral to
the success of Title VII and the long-term health of the U.S. financial
services industry and the U.S. economy as a whole.
BENJAMIN M. WEADON
Monetary Conference (June 6, 2011), available at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/06/20110607150521 su0.5477368.h
tml?distid-ucs#axzzlc6CEwtJs ("A global approach to margin will help prevent regulatory
arbitrage and a 'race to the bottom.' It will make our global financial system safer and
stronger.").
162. See id.
163. See id.
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